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Uncle Miltie's Ugly Fed Lesson
by David R. Henderson
Tech Central Station, January 26, 2006
“The right man in the right place at the right time.” 
That’s a quote from an important article in Newsweek by economist Milton 
Friedman in which he claimed that the person about to be chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Board would be a good pick. No, Friedman didn’t write that 
in 2005 about Ben Bernanke. Instead, he wrote it in 1970 about his friend and 
fellow inflation hawk, Arthur Burns, who, shortly after becoming Fed 
chairman, stoked the fires of inflation and turned out to be one of the 
worst Fed chairmen of the post-World War II years. 
Moreover, Burns, a long-time foe of price controls, began to advocate 
economy-wide price controls, which President Nixon later imposed, and 
which led to major distortions in the U.S. economy, especially in the oil 
industry. In short, Milton Friedman turned out to be wrong -- and not just 
wrong, but spectacularly wrong. To his credit, Friedman recognized this 
quickly and denounced Burns’s excessive growth in the money supply 
(which caused the high inflation of the early 1970s) as well as his advocacy of 
“incomes policy,” a euphemism for wage and price controls.
Why do I raise this issue now? Although I, like many economists I’ve spoken 
to, think that Ben Bernanke is one of the best men for the job, we all need to 
be humble about our predictions of his good performance. That’s the 
Milton Friedman/Arthur Burns lesson. Specifically, rather than give the 
kind of blanket endorsement Art Laffer gave Bernanke (see Arthur 
Laffer, “Ben Bernanke is the Right Person at the Right Time,” Wall Street 
Journal, October 26, 2005, A18), we need to look at his record carefully, the 
minuses as well as the pluses. The job of Fed chairman, after all, is 
arguably the second-most-powerful job in the U.S. government, and this 
power can be used mainly for harm rather than for good.
I have no hidden agenda here. I know that Bernanke will hold that job within 
a week or two, and if I were able to vote for or against him for Fed chairman, 
I would vote for him. But I’ve learned over the years not to ignore my doubts 
and, instead, to record and store information, the negatives along with the 
positives. As I see it, there are three main positives and two negatives. 
Let’s begin with the positives. 
First, from everything I can tell, Bernanke is a first-rate economist. 
Second, Bernanke has a solid understanding of what caused, and what 
lengthened, the Great Depression. Like Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, 
he understands the important role that contractions in the money supply 
played in causing the first few years of the Great Depression. One question 
that had many economists stumped, though, was why the large 
unemployment of the time didn’t cause real wages to fall more quickly in 
some important sectors of the economy, making more workers employable. 
Bernanke, as well as other economists, solved the puzzle. They pointed out 
that government policies, beginning with President Hoover but especially 
under Franklin Roosevelt, kept real wages high. Starting in 1933, President 
Roosevelt’s National Recovery Administration cartelized U.S. industries, 
keeping prices and wages high and slowing the growth of real output. Then, 
by 1935, when the Supreme Court ruled that the NRA was unconstitutional, 
federal labor legislation had given unions monopoly power, which they 
exploited to keep wages high. The result was that the Depression lasted much 
longer than it needed to. So the odds that Bernanke would let the money 
supply shrink enough to cause a major depression are extremely low, and the 
odds that if a recession started, Bernanke would advocate government 
policies to keep real wages artificially high, are also low.
The third positive is that Bernanke appears to be an inflation hawk, someone 
who thinks his main job is to keep inflation low, which means, as noted 
above, keeping the growth rate of the money supply low.
So, what’s not to like? 
Two things. In the introduction to his book Essays on the Great Depression 
(Princeton University Press, 2000), Bernanke writes: “Those who doubt that 
there is much connection between the economy of the 1930s and 
supercharged information-age economy of the twenty-first century are 
invited to look at the current economic headlines -- about high 
unemployment, failing banks, volatile financial markets, currency crises, and 
even deflation.” (italics added.) Recall that in 1933, the worst part of the Great 
Depression, the unemployment rate was 25 percent. In other words, one of 4 
people in the U.S. labor force was out of work. In early 2000, presumably 
when Bernanke wrote his introduction, the U.S. unemployment rate was 
about 4 percent. Most economists, if asked the U.S. economy’s “natural” 
unemployment rate -- when the economy is humming along at so-called “full 
employment” -- would answer, “About 4 to 6 percent.” If Bernanke believes 
that 4 percent unemployment is high, what might he do to the growth of the 
money supply if the unemployment rate is, as it often will be, 4 percent or 
higher? 
Now, you might argue that Bernanke was engaging in hype. But surely, all 
other things equal, hype is not good.
The second thing not to like is Bernanke’s strong fear of deflation. He has 
made it clear that he favors price stability, which, he has pointed out, “means 
avoiding both deflation and inflation.” Economists can tell you why inflation 
is bad: it’s a tax on money and it’s more hidden than most taxes. But one of 
the economists who studied the issue most carefully, Milton Friedman, 
concluded that the optimal growth rate of the money supply is one that yields 
deflation. Why? Friedman argues that the cost to the government of 
producing paper money is essentially zero and that, therefore, the cost of 
holding money should be zero so that people will hold the optimal amount of 
money. But the cost of holding money is simply the interest you give up by 
holding it. So the way to get the cost of holding money down to zero is to 
have a zero nominal interest rate. This would happen if we had deflation 
whose magnitude equaled the real interest rate -- that is, deflation of about 2 
percent per year. By contrast, Bernanke’s fear of deflation, as far as I can tell, 
is not based on economic reasoning. 
My second objection may well be a quibble. So, why do I make it? As I said 
earlier, I believe in putting my doubts on record. Let’s hope that it’s only a 
quibble. And let’s hope that Bernanke’s referring to 4 percent unemployment 
as high unemployment is pure hype and that, if so, he has decided to stop 
engaging in hype.
